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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1980s, the residents of a Cincinnati, Ohio neighborhood located 
near the ELDA landfill complained of odors and suspected that medical problems in 
their neighborhood might be linked to the nearby landfill.1  Citizens complained to 
government agencies that the odors kept them from spending time in their yards and 
forced them to keep their windows shut during the summer.2  The citizens were 
concerned about how exposure to this unknown gas might impact their health, and 
                                                                
1Richard Dahl, Audit-Privilege Laws: The Right to Know Nothing?, 107 ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 10, 107-8 (1999), available at http://ehpnet1.niehs.nih.gov/ 
docs/1999/107-10/spheres.html. 
2Testimony of Linda Briscoe and Rev. Solomon Lundy, Committee on Environment and 
Public Works of the United States Senate (1997), available at http://www.environlaw.com/ 
cepw/index.html [hereinafter Brisco & Lundy]. 
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they wanted to know what was causing the pattern of health problems that were 
showing up at the local health clinic.3   
Waste Management, Inc., the owner and operator of the ELDA landfill and the 
nation’s largest waste management company, claimed that the odors were coming 
from other chemical companies in the area.4  Ironically, the citizens confirmed their 
suspicions that the ELDA landfill was the source of the odors when Waste 
Management took community members on a public relations tour of the facility.5  
The ELDA landfill opened in 1973 and had not been built under modern standards, 
and it was still operating over a decade after it was slated to close.6  In 1989, despite 
community outrage, Waste Management tried to expand ELDA.7  The residents 
responded by filing suit against Waste Management to oppose the expansion.8   
Through the discovery process, the attorney for the residents uncovered internal 
auditing documents indicating violations of federal environmental laws.9  Although 
Waste Management provided incomplete reports and documents, many documents 
indicated that Waste Management knew of the migration of potentially dangerous 
gases10 into the neighborhood and that it was obligated to stop this problem.  
Nonetheless, Waste Management did nothing to implement remedial measures.11 
In 1993, as the case continued to drag on, the Ohio legislature was debating an 
environmental audit privilege bill, which would allow companies to keep secret 
information discovered during a company’s voluntary environmental audits.12  In 
anticipation of the Ohio audit privilege bill becoming law, Waste Management 
fought to withhold the additional incriminating audit documents from the plaintiffs 
and the court before the governor signed the bill.13  A state administrative hearing 
judge refused to allow Waste Management to use the audit privilege because the bill 
was not yet in effect.14  As a result, Waste Management had to turn over the rest of 
its environmental audit documents.15  The documents confirmed that Waste 
Management knew that the dangerous gases were migrating from the ELDA landfill 
                                                                
3Id. 
4Id. 
5Id. 
6Id.  
7Brisco & Lundy, supra note 2. 
8Id.  See also Dahl, supra note 1, at 107-8. 
9Briscoe & Lundy, supra note 2. 
10These gases included high levels of methane, as well as “benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene, 
xylene, 1-1-1 tri-chloroethane, ethylene chloride, trichloroethane, vinyl chloride, and many 
other chemicals.  Exposure to these chemicals can affect the liver, kidney, respiratory systems, 
eyes, and skin.  Several of these chemicals are carcinogenic.”  Id. 
11Dahl, supra note 1, at 107-8. 
12Id. 
13Id. 
14
 Briscoe & Lundy, supra note 2. 
15Id.  
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and that it had deceived government agencies about the problem.16  Some of the most 
incriminating documents indicated that Waste Management failed to follow the 
advice of its own consultants who had advised the company about how to update the 
facility to stop the release and migration of toxic gases.17  Eventually, the citizens 
defeated the expansion of the ELDA landfill and then filed a citizen suit under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act18 to enforce Waste Management’s 
compliance with federal environmental laws and to implement the remedial 
measures that the company’s consultants recommended to abate the toxic gas 
migration.19  
During the federal proceedings, Waste Management, using Ohio’s new 
environmental audit privilege law, tried to force the plaintiffs to return the audit 
documents and claimed that the documents were privileged because they resulted 
from Waste Management’s voluntary audits.20  These documents included those used 
in the state hearing to block the landfill expansion, as well as other documents 
beyond the scope of that proceeding.21  A federal administrative hearing examiner 
denied Waste Management’s privilege claim and stated that the privilege could not 
be applied retroactively to protect audit documents made before Ohio’s 
environmental audit privilege law was enacted.22  The parties settled in federal court 
and Waste Management agreed to pay for the residents’ health examinations and to 
implement the remedial procedures to stop the release of the toxic gases.23 
It is likely that if Ohio had enacted its audit privilege law a few years earlier, 
Waste Management would not have been forced to disclose these “smoking gun” 
documents that led to the settlement.24  Without this information, citizens living near 
the landfill would have had a difficult, if not impossible, task of showing that Waste 
Management was liable for its harm and that the company deliberately violated 
public health laws.25  Environmentalists and citizens groups argue that if companies 
can keep secret the information gathered while conducting voluntary environmental 
audits, the public will have a more difficult time learning of actual or potential 
environmental threats in their communities.26   Indeed, the information found in the 
audits “is of no small use in determining the nature and extent of the violation, 
verifying exposure information, fashioning a remedy for the violation and issuing 
                                                                
16Id. 
17Id. 
1842 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 2002).  
19Briscoe & Lundy, supra note 2. 
20Id. 
21Id. 
22Id. 
23Id. 
24Briscoe & Lundy, supra note 2. 
25Dahl, supra note 1, at 107-8. 
26Id. 
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penalties consistent with the federal law and the violations.”27  Public health and 
environmental advocates say that the ELDA landfill case represents a prime instance 
of the threats to public health that are implicit in environmental audit privilege 
laws.28 
Proponents of the environmental audit privilege legislation argue that these laws 
provide companies an opportunity to investigate their own systems and police 
themselves.29  Additionally, environmental audits give companies a less restrictive 
method of learning about their systems without a regulatory agency imposing 
deadlines or guidelines.30  Proponents, including industry and trade associations31 and 
many state governments, also argue that this new privilege encourages companies to 
conduct audits to ensure compliance with environmental regulations, while limiting 
the possibility that the audits will be used against the facility in the event of 
investigation or litigation by an agency or the public.32   
Contrarily, opponents of the legislation, including environmental groups, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. Department of Justice, argue that 
environmental audit privilege statutes unreasonably limit the public’s right to know, 
which is one of the backbones of environmental laws, and deny information to 
regulatory agencies.33   The public’s right to know what a regulated industrial 
neighbor is emitting and whether the facility is complying with the law is critical to 
fulfilling the main purpose of environmental statutes, which is to protect human 
                                                                
27D. David Altman & Mark Hughes, An Open Letter from Ohio and Colorado Petitioners 
to U.S. EPA Administrator Browner, November 10, 1997, available at 
http://www.environlaw.com/usepa/index.html.  This letter was submitted to U.S. EPA with an 
attached Petition to request that U.S. EPA withdraw Ohio’s and Colorado’s enforcement 
authority of federal environmental laws due in part to Ohio’s and Colorado’s passage of 
environmental audit privilege statutes. 
28Dahl, supra note 1, at 107-8. 
29John-Mark Stensvaag, The Fine Print of State Environmental Audit Privileges, UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. POL’Y 69, 72 (1998). 
30Stensvaag, supra note 29, at 72. 
31Three industry organizations based in Washington, D.C. are the primary forces lobbying 
for federal and state audit privilege statutes.  The Compliance Management and Policy Group 
(CMPG), founded in 1991, is the oldest and includes the American Forest & Paper 
Association; American Petroleum Institute; Chemical Manufacturers Association; National 
Solid Waste Management Association; Browning Ferris Industries; General Electric; 
Monsanto; and Waste Management.  The Corporate Environmental Enforcement Council 
(CEEC) includes AT&T; BF Goodrich; Caterpillar; Coors Brewery Company; DuPont; Elf 
Atochem of North America, Inc.; Georgia Pacific Corp.; Hoechst-Celanese Corp.; ITT Corp; 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical; Kohler Corp.; 3M Corp.; Owens-Corning; Pfizer, Inc.; 
Polaroid; Procter & Gamble; Westinghouse Electric; and Weyerhauser.  At the state level the 
Coalition for Improved Environmental Audits (CIEA) has been most active.  CIEA’s members 
include ASARCO; Bell Atlantic; Caterpillar; Dow Chemical; Hoechst-Celanese; 
Weyerhaeuser; and the Amercian Automobile Manufacturers Association.  Good Neighbor 
Project for Sustainable Communities at www.enviroweb.org/gnp (last updated July 31, 2000). 
32Stensvaag, supra note 29, at 72.  See also, Dahl, supra note 1, at 109. 
33Stensvaag, supra note 29, at 74. 
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health and the environment.34  As a result of recent environmental audit privilege 
laws passed in twenty-two states,35 citizen “watchdogs” are losing access to 
information that had enabled them to help police regulated industries’ compliance 
with environmental laws and regulations.  The lack of access to information has had 
a subsequent chilling effect on the public’s role in enforcement of environmental 
laws.36 
A facility may use the environmental audit privilege statute to keep its 
environmental audits secret37 and restrict the public’s access to information about a 
regulated facility’s impact on the environment.  Using the environmental audit 
privilege, a corporation may refuse to disclose the existence of regulatory violations 
that are discovered during voluntary internal audits and are contained in audit 
reports, so long as the corporation corrects any detected violations within a 
reasonable period of time.38  The nature of an environmental audit means that a 
company may also keep information privileged about a facility’s impacts on the 
environment that, although not currently regulated, may cause harm.39   
                                                                
34See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(b) (West 2002) (declaring that the purposes 
of this Act is “to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its 
population”). 
35ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.450-490 (Michie 2000); MINN. STAT. § 114C.22 through 
§ 114C.28 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-301-312 (Michie 2000); COLO REV. STAT. § 13-25-
126.5 (2000) and COLO REV. STAT. § 25-1-114.5 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 9-340 (Michie 1998); 
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/52.2 (1998); IND CODE § 13-28-4-1 (1998) through § 13-28-4-10 
(1998); IOWA CODE § 445J.1(1998) through § 455J.13 (1998); KAN STAT. ANN. § 60-3332 
(1997) through § 60-3339 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 224.01-040 (Michie 2000); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 324.14801 (1999) through § 324.14810 (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. 49-2-71 
(1997); MO. REV. STAT. § 490 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 445C.010 (1998) through 
§ 445C.120 (1998); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. PUBLIC HEALTH 147-E:1 (1999) through 147-
E:9 (1999); OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 3745.70 (West 2000) through § 3745.74 (West 2000); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-40-33 (Law. Co-op. 1998) through § 1-
40-37 (Law. Co-op. 1998); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.125 (Vernon 2000) and TEX. REV. 
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. § 4447cc (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-101 (1999) through 
§ 19-7-109 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198 (1998) and § 10.1-1199 (1998); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 35-11-1105 (1999) and § 35-11-1106 (1999). 
36M. Koran, Ohio Sierra Club Questions Audit Privilege Law, 8 OHIO ENVTL. L. LETTER 
10 (1997). 
37Each state statute has a slightly different definition of an environmental audit, however, 
Oregon’s is a representative example.  “An environmental audit report may include field notes 
and records of observations, findings, opinions, suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memoranda, 
drawings, photographs, computer-generated or electronically recorded information, maps, 
charts, graphs and surveys, provided such supporting information is collected or developed for 
the primary purpose and in the course of an environmental audit.” OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 
(1999).  See also infra Part II(C) of this note. 
38David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 969, 971 (1996). 
39For example, relatively few of the thousands of chemicals that are used by industry are 
regulated.  Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information As Environmental Regulation: TRI and 
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L. J. 257 (2001) (citing 
Kenneth Geiser, The Unfinished Business of Pollution Prevention, 29 GA. L. REV. 473 (1995) 
(noting that as of 1995, EPA had completed full-scale health assessments on fewer than 100 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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Most audit privilege laws contain two primary components: a privilege 
component and an immunity component.  The component that is the focus of this 
Note is the “privilege” component, which affords secrecy to the environmental audit 
information gathered voluntarily by companies, but which is not subject to 
mandatory disclosure under a statute or regulation.  Many state statutes also contain 
an environmental audit “immunity” component that prohibits the government from 
penalizing companies when the company discloses and corrects certain types of 
internally discovered violations.40 
This Note argues that because the public places a high premium on its right to 
know, Congress should enact a federal statute that prohibits a privilege for 
environmental audits.  A federal prohibition on a privilege for environmental audits 
will make the state statutes unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution.41  This Note has six parts.  Part II provides background 
on the traditional environmental regulatory regime and the role that the public plays 
in enforcing environmental statutes.  Part III is an analysis of some of the typical 
state environmental audit privilege laws, including a discussion of the major themes 
of the statutes.  Part IV is a discussion of the EPA Final Policy Statement on 
Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of 
Violations (U.S. EPA’s Audit Policy).  Part V is a discussion of the public’s right to 
know and how creating a privilege for environmental audits conflicts with the 
public’s right to know.  Part VI advocates for the passage of federal legislation that 
prohibits the use of a privilege for environmental audits, which would leave the state 
environmental audit privilege statutes unconstitutional and therefore unavailable for 
use. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Traditional Environmental Regulatory Regime 
Environmental law has evolved into a complex regulatory system during the past 
three decades.42  Federal, state, and local governments are responsible for designing, 
                                                          
chemicals)).  Environmental audits will invariably contain information about regulated 
chemicals as well as unregulated chemicals.  Simply because a chemical is not currently 
regulated does not mean that the chemical is not known to be, or will not become known to be, 
harmful and therefore will perhaps be regulated in the future. 
40Dana, supra note 38, at 971.  Seventeen states’ statutes contain an immunity provision in 
addition to the environmental audit privilege provision.  They are: Alabama, Alaska, 
Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming.  See text accompanying 
supra note 35 for statutes citations.  This Note contains only a surface discussion of the 
immunity provisions of these statutes.  Although the immunity provisions provide a 
disincentive for regulatory compliance and are problematic for effective environmental 
regulatory enforcement, unlike audit privilege provisions, immunity provisions do not conflict 
with the public’s right to know.  See generally, Dana, supra note 36, at 969 (for a thorough 
discussion of the environmental audit immunity provisions). 
41U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. 
42Miri Berlin, Environmental Auditing: Entering the Eco-Information Highway, 6 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 618 (1998). 
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implementing, and enforcing environmental statutes and regulations.43  Additionally, 
citizens, both individuals and through environmental groups, play an integral role in 
the enforcement of environmental and public health laws through education, public 
pressure, and citizen suits.44   
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the primary agency charged 
with implementing and enforcing the environmental laws, regulations, and policies.45  
Corporations and individuals must comply with numerous environmental statutes 
and corresponding regulations, including the Clean Air Act (CAA),46 the Clean 
Water Act (CWA),47 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),48 the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA),49 as well as 
many others.50  These statutes require that certain data, usually information relevant 
to monitoring pollutants leaving the facility, be compiled, recorded, and reported to 
state and federal enforcement agencies, usually for the purpose of ensuring permit 
compliance.51  One of the reasons that many companies may work to maintain 
                                                                
43See, e.g., The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 
(EPCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11001-11050 (West 2002), which establishes emergency plans in 
the event of a large hazardous chemical release and requires reporting of toxic releases, was 
passed by Congress and is implemented and enforced by the U.S. EPA, which, delegates 
enforcement authority in Ohio to the Ohio EPA, which also enforces the Ohio Community 
Right-to-Know regulations as promulgated by the Ohio legislature.  Local fire departments 
oversee parts of the community right-to-know laws as well, and the judiciary sorts out legal 
challenges to these regulations.  See, e.g., Ohio Chamber of Commerce v. State Emergency 
Response Comm., 597 N.E.2d 487 (Ohio 1992).  Other environmental statutes that will be 
discussed in this Note include the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671 (West 2002); 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2002); The Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992 (West 2002). 
44See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 
(1987) (discussing connection between the citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1997); Hallstrom v. 
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 1037 (1989) (individual property owners RCRA action dismissed 
for failing to conform to citizen suit notice requirements).  For an excellent example of 
citizens asserting public pressure in the form of “good neighbor agreements” see, Marianne F. 
Adriatico, The Good Neighbor Agreement: Environmental Excellence Without Compromise, 5 
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 285 (1999). 
45Thomas F.P. Sullivan, FUNDAMENTALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 1 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 1997).  
4642 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 2002). 
4733 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2002). 
4842 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992K (West 2002). 
4942 U.S.C.A. §§ 11001-11050 (West 2002). 
50Berlin, supra note 42, at 618. 
51The Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits 
requires monitoring at the point of discharge of effluent into the receiving waters the results of 
which must be reported to the permitting agency at least once a year.  40 C.F.R. § 122.44(i)(2) 
(2002).  The Clean Air Act requires state implementation plans (SIP) for achieving national 
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) whereby the SIP must include monitoring and 
periodic reporting of emissions by stationary sources, correlate emission reports with relevant 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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compliance is that penalties for violating environmental regulations include, but are 
not limited to, company fines or injunctions, and incarceration and fines for 
employees or corporate officers who are held responsible.52 
B.  Role of the Public in Enforcing Environmental Statutes 
The process by which a pollutant comes to be regulated is complex and generally 
only occurs after extensive study determines that the pollutant poses a significant 
risk to human health or the environment at particular levels of environmental 
concentration or exposure.53  Only after often enormously costly studies and a slow 
process54 does the EPA determine the regulatory standards for the allowable 
emission or exposure levels of a pollutant.  
It is within this process of determining regulatory standards that the public plays 
an integral role in implementing and enforcing environmental statutes and 
advocating for the protection of public health.  The public participates in the process 
in both substantive and procedural ways.  The substantive role of the public occurs 
when the EPA drafts the regulatory requirement or pollutant standard, at which time 
industries, environmental advocates, and citizens may challenge the appropriateness 
of the regulation or standard.55  The public’s procedural involvement occurs when a 
company is statutorily required to report environmental data to the EPA, or when a 
facility applies for a permit, and this information is then made accessible to the 
public.56  Through these processes, the public plays a critical role in ensuring 
                                                          
emissions limitations, and make the reports available to the EPA and for public inspection.  
Clean Air Act, § 110(a)(2)(E) (2002); EPCRA requires notification of toxic releases that 
exceed allowable limits.  40 C.F.R. § 355.40(a) (2002). 
52See, e.g., EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11045 (West 2002) (providing for civil penalties of up 
to $25,000 per violation and criminal penalties of up to $25,000 or imprisonment for not more 
than two years, or both); Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2615 (West 2002) 
(providing for civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation and criminal penalties of up to 
$25,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both).  See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C.A. § 1319 (West 2002) (providing for criminal penalties for negligence of a fine of not 
less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more 
than one year, or both; and providing that any person who knowingly violates the statute shall 
be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or 
imprisonment for not more than three years, or both; a violation that knowingly endangers 
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury carries a fine of not more 
than $250,000 or imprisonment of not more than fifteen years, or both; however, organizations 
convicted of knowing endangerment face up to $1,000,000 fines). 
53Karkkainen, supra note 39, at 257 (citing John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable 
Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 
276-77 (1991)).  
54Id. at 266. 
55Id. at 268.  Citizens and industries may “question the agency’s assumptions, question the 
adequacy of its data and present contrary evidence in the rule making record” thus influencing 
the language of the final regulation, or if the regulation is already implemented, the challenge 
may influence the chance of the regulation surviving judicial review.  Id.    
56See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3007(a)-(e) (2000); Clean Air Act, 
40 C.F.R. § 110(a)(2)(E) (2000); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11044(a) (West 2002). 
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environmental compliance in the process of developing environmental standards and 
ensuring compliance with the standards once they are in place.   
Citizens, primarily through environmental organizations, are also critical to 
environmental enforcement through their education of the public and application of 
pressure on agencies and industries to achieve compliance.57  In the form of “good 
neighbor campaigns,” citizens who are most affected by a local facility’s activities 
become involved as stakeholders and work for improvements in their community.58  
Good neighbor campaigns “treat polluting companies as part of the community, and 
treat chemical hazards as a problem to be resolved within the community and 
directly with the company.  The goal is to eliminate the chemical hazard in a way 
that restores the relationship between the company and its neighbors, with honest 
communication, mutual trust, and real accountability.”59  Good neighbor campaigns 
may also include stakeholder audits, whereby neighbors and workers engage in 
“direct, on-site evaluation of a local facility to identify any changes that may be 
needed to ensure sustainability.”60 
As will be discussed below, the public additionally plays an on-going role in 
enforcement through citizen suits, a mechanism whereby a citizen can sue an alleged 
violator or the government for alleged lack of enforcement of an environmental 
statute or regulation.61  The following discussion demonstrates how four of the major 
federal environmental statutes incorporate the public’s right to know into the statute 
and provide mechanisms, particularly the citizen suit provision, for citizens to 
enforce public health laws. 
                                                                
57See, e.g., Ohio Citizen Action (OCA), available at www.ohiocitizen.org (last visited 
June 6, 2001) (an Ohio statewide consumer rights and environmental organization, uses good 
neighbor campaigns to organize, educate, and empower citizens to work with neighboring 
facilities to reduce toxic emissions.  National organizations like the Public Interest Research 
Groups (PIRGs), Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund, National Toxics Campaign, as 
well as numerous local environmental groups, have also played crucial roles in environmental 
enforcement). 
58Adriactico, supra note 5, at 288.  Local stakeholders include private citizens, community 
organizations, environmental organizations and labor unions.  See Good Neighbor Project for 
Sustainable Industries, Model Principles for Stakeholder Evaluation, at 
www.enviroweb.org/gnp (last updated July 31, 2000). 
59E-mail from Amy Ryder, Cleveland Program Director, Ohio Citizen Action (Feb. 21, 
2001) (on file with the author).  
60See Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable Communities, available at www.enviro 
web.org/gnp/gnas.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2001). 
61See infra, text at II(B)(1-4).  The citizen suit provision that is now found in all 
environmental statutes administered by the EPA, except the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), has its origin in the Clean Air Act.  Originally citizens were only 
authorized to sue for injunctive relief to force a regulated entity into compliance with a statute 
or regulation, or to require the EPA to perform a mandatory duty required by the statute.  As a 
result of the Clean Air Act amendments in 1990, citizens can now sue a regulated entity for 
civil penalties.  Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws: 
The Citizen Suit Provisions, SE98 ALI-ABA 303, 307 (2000) [hereinafter Miller].    
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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1.  Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986 
(EPCRA)62 is one example of the public’s right to know being clearly incorporated 
into environmental legislation.  EPCRA grants the public access to information about 
certain facilities’ toxic inventories and releases.63  The ‘Right to Know’ component 
of EPRCA “aims to compile accurate, reliable information on the presence and 
release of toxic chemicals and to make that information available (to the government, 
the facilities’ employees, and the public) at a reasonably localized level.”64   
Facilities that meet minimum size and emission thresholds and release specified 
toxic chemicals65 into the environment must inventory chemicals used at their 
facilities and report these releases annually66 in what is known as the Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) database.67 
The Toxic Release Inventory is a national database that contains information on 
the specific toxic chemical releases and other waste management activities reported 
annually by specified industry groups68 as well as federal facilities.69   The current 
                                                                
6242 U.S.C.A. §§ 11001-11050 (West 2002). 
63Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1239 (7th Cir. 1996). 
64Id.  See also, EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11021 (West 2002) (requiring that Material Safety 
Data Sheets be given to employees); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11022 (West 2002) (requiring 
that emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms be given to local fire departments 
and local and state emergency response departments); 42 U.S.C.A. § 11044 (West 2002) 
(requiring public availability of emergency plans, data sheets, and forms). 
6542 U.S.C.A. § 11022 (West 2002) (containing the hazardous chemical inventory 
reporting requirements). 
6642 U.S.C.A. § 11023 (West 2002) (detailing requirements for reporting chemical 
releases). 
67Karkkainen, supra note 39, at 259.  The complete EPA Toxic Release Inventory 
database is available through the National Library of Medicine’s TOXNET system at 
http://www.toxnet.nlm.nih.bog/index.html (last modified Aug. 11, 2000).  See also U.S.EPA 
website, available at http://www.epa.gov.triexplorer for general TRI information (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2001).  See generally Karkkainen, supra note 39 (an excellent overview of the TRI 
and advocating for expansion of this regulatory system). 
68Industries regulated under the TRI include those in food; tobacco; textiles; apparel; 
lumber and wood; furniture; paper; printing and publishing; chemicals; petroleum and coal; 
rubber and plastics; leather; stone, clay and glass; primary metals; fabricated metals; 
machinery (excluding electrical); electrical and electronic equipment; transportation 
equipment; instruments; miscellaneous manufacturing.  As of the 1998 Reporting Year, 
additional industries must report TRI information, including: metal mining; coal mining; 
electrical utilities that combust coal and /or oil; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Subtitle C hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities; chemicals and allied products 
wholesale distributors; petroleum bulk plants and terminals; and solvent recovery services.  
U.S. EPA website, available at http://www.epa.gov.tri/siccode.html (last modified Feb. 10, 
2000). 
69http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer (last modified Oct. 12, 2000). 
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TRI chemical list contains 579 individual chemicals divided into twenty-eight 
categories.70 
The TRI data is useful for identifying which facilities release certain toxic 
chemicals into the environment and provides estimates of those toxic releases; 
however, the TRI data has certain limitations.71  One limitation is the accuracy of the 
data because the TRI data is reported on a good faith basis by the industry and only 
requires reasonable estimates, not exact figures.72  Additionally, the TRI data does 
not reflect the public’s exposure to those chemicals and is not sufficient to calculate 
potential adverse health effects.73  Nevertheless, this information is crucial to 
ensuring compliance because “cross checking between the TRI data and data made 
available under other statutes makes citizen enforcement of EPCRA and other 
federal environmental statutes possible.”74  Additionally, before environmental audit 
privilege laws were passed, it was useful for plaintiffs to compare TRI data and a 
facility’s environmental audit information that would be available to the public 
through a state agency or a lawsuit.  The comparison may show that the company is 
not accurately or properly reporting information to federal and state agencies. 
In addition to EPCRA recognizing the public right to access information, EPCRA 
grants citizens the right to sue facilities that violate the law in the event that the 
federal or state government fails to take enforcement action against the violator.75  A 
citizen may also sue a government agency when the agency fails to enforce the law 
or fails to provide a “mechanism for public availability of information.”76  If the EPA 
or a state agency is “diligently pursuing” enforcement against a violator, the statute 
                                                                
70http://www.epa.gov/tri/chemical.htm (last modified Mar. 23, 2000). For an excellent 
report on Ohio’s TRI data see CITIZENS POLICY CENTER, POISONS IN OUR MIDST (1998) 
(available at Citizens Policy Center, 614 W. Superior Avenue. Suite 1200, Cleveland, Ohio 
44113).  
71http://www.epa.gov/tri/chemical.htm (last modified Mar. 23, 2000). 
72
“In order to provide the information required…a facility may use readily available data 
(including monitoring data) collected pursuant to other provisions of law, or, where such data 
are not readily available, reasonable estimates of the amounts involved.”  EPCRA, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 11023 (West 2002). 
73http://www.epa.gov.triexplorer (last modified Oct. 12, 2000).  See also, Karkainnen 
supra note 37, at 331 (noting that TRI does not factor in “proximity to population, exposure 
route, dispersion, persistence, sensitivity of exposed populations, or other important risk-
related factors” and therefore TRI is not “a very good guide to actual human and 
environmental risks”). 
74Miller, supra note 61, at 307.  
75EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11046(a) (West 2002).  Generally, the person(s) bringing the suit 
is required to have standing, subject matter jurisdiction, and must give the EPA and violator 
60 days notice before a suit is filed.  Under other environmental statutes, however, a suit may 
be filed immediately after notice is given for violations of hazardous pollutant or substance 
requirements under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (West 2002), Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (West 2002); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 6972(b)(1)(A) (West 2002).  Miller, supra note 61, at 315. 
76EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11046(a) (West 2002). 
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bars a citizen suit against the same violator for the same violation.77  EPCRA does 
permit private suits for claims of personal injury or property damage, regardless of 
whether an agency is pursuing enforcement.78 
2.  Clean Water Act 
The public also plays a role in enforcement of the Clean Water Act, which 
governs discharges of pollutants into surface waters.79  Any facility that has a point 
source80 that discharges pollution into surface waters must obtain a National 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.81  The EPA generally 
requires owners and operators of facilities to maintain records and make reports 
regarding the facility’s discharges.82  With the exception of a company’s trade 
secrets, the statute provides that information in the reports must be made available to 
the public.83  Citizens may use this information to ensure a facility’s compliance by 
applying public pressure on the agency to enforce the law.    
Additionally, citizens84 may file suit against the government for failure to enforce 
a non-discretionary duty of the Clean Water Act, or directly against the alleged 
violator.85  An incentive for the public to use the citizen suit is the provision that the 
court may award costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert witness 
fees to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court 
determines such an award is appropriate.86  This provision is critical to ensuring that 
                                                                
77Miller, supra note 61, at 316.  However, most courts have refused to bar a citizen suit 
because the government had taken administrative action; see, e.g., Public Interest Research 
Group of N.J. v. Witco Chemical Corp. 331, EERC 1571 (D.N.J. 1990); but some courts have 
barred citizen suits if the government agency has administrative enforcement powers 
comparable to a court.  See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & 
Olicott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131 (3rd Cir. 1985).    
78Miller, supra note 61, at 316. 
7933 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2002). 
80The term “point source” means any “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, 
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, 
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating 
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural 
storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”  33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14) 
(West 2002). 
81Berlin, supra note 42, at 627 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994)). 
82Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1994)). 
83Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (1994)). 
84The term “citizen” means a person or persons having an interest that is or may be 
adversely affected. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(g) (West 2002).  
8533 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (West 2002).  Before filing the action, the citizen must give sixty 
days notice to the EPA Administrator, the state in which the alleged violation occurred, and 
the alleged violator.  Additionally, a citizen may not file suit if the administrator or state has 
already commenced civil or criminal proceedings against the alleged violator for the same 
violation.  33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b) (West 2002). 
8633 U.S.C.A. § 1365(d) (West 2002). 
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members of the public who file citizen suits will be able to find competent attorneys 
who will take the case because the citizens are not forced to provide the resources 
necessary to carry out successful litigation. 
3.  Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Act87 provides, among other things, the EPA with authority to 
establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for individual air 
pollutants,88 and also contains express provisions that the public may participate in 
the Act’s enforcement.89  NAAQS are implemented through state implementation 
plans (SIPs) which are required to include emission limits, measures for controlling 
air pollution, and methods for compiling and analyzing data.90  If a major new 
facility wants to locate in an area that has achieved its NAAQS, then the facility 
must get a prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) permit.91  Permit applicants 
must collect continuous air quality monitoring data for one year prior to applying for 
the PSD permit.92  The public has a right to participate in the hearing on the PSD 
permit application and, therefore, the monitoring data must be made publicly 
available at the hearing.93  Facilities that keep improper records94 make themselves 
vulnerable to criminal sanctions and civil penalties.95   By allowing the public to 
participate in the hearing process and to access the permit application and monitoring 
data, the Clean Air Act lays out an explicit public right to know what quantity and 
type of pollutants will be added to the community’s air quality if the permit is 
granted.  
The public may also play a role in enforcement of the Clean Air Act through the 
Act’s citizen suit provision.96  Similar to the citizen suit requirements of the Clean 
Water Act, a member of the public may file a citizen suit against any person, 
including the government or an agency, who is alleged to have violated an emission 
standard or limitation or an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect 
to a standard or limitation.97  A citizen may also file a citizen suit against the EPA 
Administrator for an alleged failure to perform a non-discretionary duty,98 or against 
                                                                
87Berlin, supra note 42, at 626 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)). 
88Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1994)). 
89Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(e) (1994)). 
90Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410 (1994)). 
9142 U.S.C.A. § 7475(a)(3)(B) (West 2002) and 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1996)). 
92Berlin, supra note 42, at 627 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(e) (1994)). 
93Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(e)(1994)).  See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 7475(a)(2) (West 2002). 
9442 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (West 2002). 
95Berlin, supra note 42, at 627. 
9642 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West 2002). 
9742 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a)(1) (West 2002)).  An emission standard or limitation is defined 
further in 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(f) (West 2002).   
9842 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a)(2) (West 2002). 
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a person who constructs a facility without a permit if the facility required a permit.99  
Importantly, the court may also award reasonable attorney and expert witness fees to 
“any prevailing or substantially prevailing party,” when the court determines it is 
appropriate.100 
Congress included the citizen suit provision because it recognized that “neither 
federal nor state governments have the resources to ensure that generators of air 
pollutants are consistently in compliance with the Act.  Therefore to supplement 
governmental enforcement of the Clean Air Act citizen suits provide interstitial 
means for enforcement of the environmental standards in furtherance of the remedial 
purpose of the Act.”101 
4.  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
The public’s role in enforcement of environmental laws is also incorporated into 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),102 which regulates the 
disposal of hazardous waste.  RCRA requires the comprehensive development of a 
record keeping, manifest, and reporting system to track certain types of waste from 
the time the waste is created until the waste is disposed.103  RCRA requires hazardous 
waste generators104 to file biennial reports describing their waste production.105  
Treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDs) serve as final destinations of waste 
and are subject to extensive permitting requirements and other regulations.106  TSD 
owners and operators must keep records of all waste received and stored and make 
these records available to the EPA, which subsequently makes the information 
available to the public.107  The EPA may enforce high civil liability or criminal 
sanctions against RCRA violators.108   
Similar to other environmental statutes, under RCRA, a citizen or environmental 
group may file a citizen suit against a facility that violates RCRA requirements.109  
Congress clearly included the public’s right to know in RCRA because the statute 
gives the public the right to access vital information about hazardous waste in our 
communities and to participate in the enforcement of the RCRA through citizen 
suits. 
                                                                
9942 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a)(3) (West 2002). 
10042 U.S.C.A. § 7604(d) (West 2002). 
101Sierra Club v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 894 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Colo. 1995). 
10242 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 2002). 
10342 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921(b), 6922 (West 2002). 
104Berlin, supra note 42, at 628 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1996)). 
105Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 262.41(a) (1996)). 
106Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 264.73 (1996)). 
10740 C.F.R. § 264.73 (1996). 
108Berlin, supra note 42, at 628 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1994)). 
109Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994)). 
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C.  What is an Environmental Audit? 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental audits as 
“systematic, documented, periodic, and objective reviews by regulated entities of 
facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements.”110  
There are various types of environmental audits each of which are used for different 
purposes.  The two most common environmental audits are compliance audits and 
management audits.111 Compliance audits are conducted by internal or external 
environmental specialists and have three primary purposes.112  Two interrelated 
purposes of the compliance audit are to investigate a facility's compliance with 
applicable environmental laws and regulations, and to evaluate the facility’s 
vulnerability to enforcement action.113  The third primary purpose is to identify 
environmental liability risks that are not necessarily associated with regulations, but 
may expose the facility to a private lawsuit.114  The compliance audit will also 
evaluate the need and methods used for fixing any existing environmental 
problems.115 
Management audits evaluate procedures related to environmental systems within 
a facility.116  These audits include a review of the facility’s management systems and 
procedures for controlling risk to find and remedy possible violations and potentially 
problematic environmental conditions.117  The environmental audit privilege statutes 
may relate to either the compliance audit or the management audit. 
                                                                
110EPA Final Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, 
correction, and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19618, 19625 (2000) [hereinafter EPA 
Audit Policy]. 
111Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audit and Enforcement Policy, 
16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 366 (1992). 
112Id. 
113Id. 
114Id. Private lawsuits or “non-regulatory risks” include potential liability associated with 
toxic tort actions, off-site disposal, or citizen suits.  
115Id. 
116Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 111, at 366 (“Management audits evaluate a corporation's 
or facility's management systems or procedures for (1) identifying environmental 
noncompliance, (2) assessing environmental risks, (3) informing the corporation's decision 
makers of such risks, (4) designing and implementing measures to prevent environmental 
violations and mitigate non-regulatory environmental risk, and (5) remediating or otherwise 
responding to potential or actual environmental hazards.”). 
117Id.  (A comprehensive management audit will review the organization, structure, and 
placement of the environmental oversight functions; will evaluate the adequacy of existing 
statements of the company's environmental mission, goals, and objectives; and will consider 
the adequacy of current planning and control mechanisms to ensure that environmental criteria 
are adequately considered in evaluating both individual and organizational performance. It 
also entails developing operating procedures, training manuals, preventive maintenance 
programs, proactive planning, and total quality management enhancements to convert high-
minded policy statements into a pervasive corporate culture of environmental stewardship). 
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A facility may conduct an environmental audit because a governmental agency 
compels it to or because it voluntarily chooses to do so.  The EPA may require a 
violator to conduct an audit as part of a settlement agreement with the EPA;118 
however, generally the EPA either requires or conducts audits to evaluate 
compliance not related to any previous violation.119  Many state and federal 
environmental laws also require regulated entities to disclose to agencies violations 
that are discovered during voluntary internal compliance audits so as to ensure 
compliance where agency-conducted audits are not feasible.120   
As described above, many regulated companies voluntarily conduct 
environmental audits to comprehensively evaluate their facilities, operations, and 
procedures to determine whether they are in compliance with applicable 
environmental regulations.121  Many facilities also regularly conduct environmental 
audits to detect inefficiencies and problems in their own systems.122   Trade 
associations often encourage industries to conduct environmental audits in order to 
promote corporate responsibility.123  Voluntary environmental audits are important 
because they can provide a facility with a cost effective method of discovering 
existing or potential environmental violations.124  Timely discovery can reduce 
pollution before or immediately after it is unexpectedly released.125 
D.  Why Other Privilege Doctrines Do Not Protect Environmental Audits 
Regulated companies that conduct voluntary environmental audits have found 
that these audits provide an effective and proactive means to detect actual or 
potential environmental violations.126  Many companies have discovered, however, 
that if the information is disclosed, it may also “create road maps for external 
                                                                
118Virginia Morton Creighton, Comment, Colorado’s Environmental Audit Privilege 
Statute: Striking the Appropriate Balance?,  67 U. COLO. L. REV. 443, 446 (1996). 
119See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3007(a)-(e).  However, “EPA’s 
inspection activities under RCRA Section 3007 are subject to the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.” David R. Case, Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 355 (Thomas F.P. 
Sullivan ed., 1997). 
120Dana, supra note 38, at 969 (citing Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Lee D. Hoffman, Self-
Reporting and Self-Monitoring Requirements Under Environmental Laws, 1 ENVTL. L. 681 
(1995) (comprehensively reviewing reporting requirements)). 
121Keith M. Casto & Tiffany Billingsley Potter, Environmental Audits: Barriers, 
Opportunities and a Recommendation, 5 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 233 (1999). 
122A 1995 Price-Waterhouse survey found that 90% of the corporate respondents who 
conduct audits said that a motivating factor to conducting audits was to find and correct 
violations before they were found by government inspectors.  Audit Policy, supra note 110 
(stating that the Price-Waterhouse survey is contained in the Docket as Document VIII-A-76).  
123Kevin Mark Smith, Preventing Discovery of Internal Investigation Materials: 
Protecting Oneself From One’s Own Petard, 69 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N. 28, 31(Aug. 2000). 
124Id. at 30. 
125Id. 
126Id. at 31. 
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investigations which could lead to unforeseen legal liability.”127   Lawyers caution 
companies that audits may lead plaintiffs and regulators to information that amounts 
to the “smoking gun” that could be used against the company.128 
There are several state and federally recognized privileges, each of which allows 
certain types of documents or communications to be kept confidential. Generally, 
however, companies cannot use traditional evidentiary privileges, such as attorney-
client and work-product privileges, to withhold their environmental audits from 
government agencies or private litigants.129  The attorney-client privilege allows 
confidential communications between an attorney and his/her client to remain 
privileged so long as the communication is in regards to legal advice made in the 
course of the relationship.130  This privilege precludes protection of communication 
concerning general business advice or advice given in the ordinary course of 
business.131  The voluntary environmental audits are usually conducted during the 
ordinary course of business and are used to determine regulatory compliance; they 
are not conducted under the auspices of receiving specific legal advice or services.132    
Additionally, the attorney-client privilege cannot be used to hide the underlying 
facts, only communications regarding the facts.  The purpose of an audit is to 
determine facts about a facility’s environmental management and compliance, and 
therefore audits are comprised primarily of facts and data, not communications 
between the attorney and client.  Therefore environmental audits fall outside the 
scope of attorney-client privilege protection. 
The work-product privilege also may be inappropriate to protect voluntary 
environmental audits.  The work-product privilege protects documents prepared in 
anticipation of a client’s pending or potential litigation regarding the attorney’s legal 
impressions, strategy, and thought processes.133  Environmental audits generally do 
not qualify for protection under the work-product doctrine because audits are not 
usually prepared by a lawyer in anticipation of pending or potential litigation.134  
Additionally, like the attorney-client privilege, the work-product privilege does not 
hide facts, only legal impressions and strategies regarding those facts, and it is not 
intended to hide the truth.135  Environmental audits, however, when kept privileged 
have a strong potential to hide facts and the truth of the alleged violations.  For 
example, data related to emissions of air pollutants that are beyond the scope of the 
statutory reporting requirements are facts that could be privileged.  Therefore, the 
                                                                
127Id. 
128Gary W. Ballesteros, The Limitations of State Environmental Audit Privilege Statutes, 
ENV’T TODAY, April 1995, available at http://www.jenner.com/practice/environ/ 
articles/gwb9601.html. 
129Dana, supra note 38, at 969. 
130See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
131Id. 
132Karen Heyob, Ohio’s New Statutory Audit Privilege: Promoting Environmental 
Performance or a Dirty Little Secrets Act?, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 379, 391-93 (1997). 
133Id. at 396. 
134Id. 
135JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 564 (9th ed. 1999).  
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privilege is inconsistent with the reasoning behind the work-product privilege, which 
only protects the attorney’s legal strategy, analysis, and thoughts, not the underlying 
facts. 
Some states and federal jurisdictions have recognized a “critical self-evaluation” 
privilege that protects evaluative (as opposed to objective factual) statements 
contained in the self-critical reports of businesses.136  The courts that have recognized 
a critical self-evaluation privilege have generally required that the proponent satisfy 
four elements.137  First, “the information must result from a critical self-analysis 
undertaken by the party seeking protection; second, the public must have a strong 
interest in preserving the free flow of that type of information sought [to be 
protected; third], the information must be of the type whose flow would be curtailed 
if discovery were allowed;”138 and fourth, “the document must have been prepared 
with the expectation of confidentiality, and that confidentiality has been preserved.”   
No jurisdiction, however, has applied this privilege to environmental self-policing,139 
and at least two courts have rejected a claim of self-evaluative privilege in the 
environmental context.140 
                                                                
136Dana, supra note 38, at 1006 (citing generally Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical 
Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1087-1091 (1983).  See Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 
50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff’d without op., 479 F. 2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (creating a 
privilege for physician peer reviews concerning the quality of patient care); Tharp v. Sivyer 
Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (collecting cases); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia 
Co., 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (extending the privilege to a company’s internal 
assessment of its equal employment opportunity practices).  See also United States v. Dexter, 
132 F.R.D. 8, (D. Conn. July 9, 1990) (“The ‘self-critical’ privilege has also been recognized 
in a variety of actions in which confidentiality is ‘essential to the free flow of information and 
… the free flow of information is essential to promote recognized public interests.’ [ ] These 
cases suggest that since the ‘self-critical’ privilege is rooted in promotion of the public 
interest, a court should take cognizance … of Congress’s role in declaring what is in the public 
interest.  Cf. United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d at 126 ([T]he privilege does not apply to 
enforcement of tax laws because Congress has decided the policy issue.”)).  Id.  
137Heyob, supra note 132, at 393. 
138Carr, Sr. v. El Dorado Chemical Co. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5752, * 22 (1997) (citing 
LEAN, Inc. v. Evans Indus., Inc. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8117 (E.D. La. 1996) (citing 
Dowling, v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc. 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
139Dana, supra note 38, at 1006. 
140See United States v. Dexter, 132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. July 9, 1990) (The court 
determined that “Congress ha[d] made an explicit declaration of public policy for ‘it is the 
policy of the United States that there should be no discharges of oil or hazardous substances 
into or upon the navigable waters of the United States…’.  33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (1994). 
Furthermore, while the named plaintiff is the United States of America, the suit was brought 
‘at the request of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,’ who is 
empowered to ‘commence a civil action’ against any person who has violated the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B) (1994). [Therefore the court found that] the application of the 
‘self-critical’ privilege in this action would effectively impede the Administrator's ability to 
enforce the Clean Water Act, and would be contrary to stated public policy.”).  See also Carr, 
Sr. v. El Dorado Chemical Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5752 (W.D. Ark. April 14, 1997); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386 (D. Md. 1994) (company must comply with a 
subpoena under Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act for self-evaluative documents). 
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For good reason, industries do not feel that they can rely on the attorney-client, 
work-product, or rare critical self-evaluation privileges to shelter themselves from 
potential legal liability.  As a result, many industries lobbied state legislatures to 
create a statutory scheme that would ensure that environmental audit information 
could not be disclosed to regulatory agencies and the public.141  The results in 
twenty-two states are environmental audit privilege laws.142 
Under the audit privilege regime, neither the public agencies charged with 
enforcing environmental laws, nor the public can access the audit once a company 
claims the information is privileged under the state statute.143  Companies must still 
disclose certain information under the various environmental laws and regulations.  
The production and disclosure requirements under the various federal environmental 
laws typically are designed to produce only those specific pieces of information that 
are necessary to develop or enforce particular regulatory standards under a particular 
statute.144  The advantage to the public of obtaining voluntarily conducted audits is 
that this type of audit frequently contains valuable pieces of information that are not 
subject to mandatory disclosure, but provides to agencies and the public a better 
picture of actual or potential public health problems that exist at a facility.145  It is 
also this type of information that enables the public to mount successful good 
neighbor campaigns and citizen suits.  For these reasons, it is access to precisely this 
type of information that the proponents of the environmental audit privilege statutes 
want to keep secret. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PRIVILEGE STATUTES 
In 1993, Oregon became the first state to pass an environmental audit privilege 
law.146  Oregon allows companies to conduct voluntary self-audits of their 
environmental compliance programs and management systems and then claim 
privilege over the audit information.147  Twenty-two states have enacted various 
versions of Oregon’s environmental audit privilege statute.148 
                                                                
141Stensvaag, supra note 29, at 74-5. 
142See supra note 35 and accompanying text (list of all twenty-two states with an 
environmental audit privilege law).  
143See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-303 (Michie 1999) (creating a privilege to “protect the 
confidentiality of communications relating to voluntary internal environmental audits” which 
“shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil or administrative legal action, including 
enforcement actions”); See also, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.71 (West 2002) (extending the 
privilege to civil and administrative proceedings; provides that the audit is not subject to 
discovery or admissible as evidence; but the privilege does not apply to criminal proceedings). 
144Karkkainen, supra note 39, at 284. 
145See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
146OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 468.963 (West 2002).  
147OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 468.963(2) (West 2002).  
148See supra text accompanying note 35, which contains a complete listing of all state 
audit privilege statutes.  The twenty-two states does not include New Jersey, South Dakota, 
and Rhode Island, each of which has an environmental audit immunity statute that does not 
include an audit privilege. 
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In Ohio, Oregon, and other states, owners or operators of a facility whose 
activities are regulated by various environmental statutes may invoke the privilege 
over a voluntary environmental audit.149  Ohio also includes a rather generic 
provision whereby the privilege may be invoked when the facility conducts activities 
under “any other sections or chapters of the revised code the principal purpose of 
which is environmental protection … [and] any federal or local counterparts or 
extensions of those sections or chapters.”150  This language appears to mean that the 
environmental audit privilege extends to any and all audits assessing compliance 
with any Ohio statute having the “principal purpose” of “environmental protection” 
or to any federal or local counterpart or extension of such a statute.151  This is a broad 
privilege that may be invoked over specific environmental information, as well as 
information discovered during an environmental audit that may be related to, but not 
directly involved in, any environmental statute, regulation, or ordinance.152 
In order to protect the environmental audit privilege, some states require that the 
documents be formally labeled in a specific way.153  Ohio requires that the front 
cover or first page of the report be prominently labeled with “Environmental Audit 
Report: Privileged Information” or substantially comparable language.154  Texas 
requires that the audit report be labeled “COMPLIANCE REPORT: PRIVILEGED 
DOCUMENT,” or words of similar import.155  In Ohio, if the audit report is not 
properly labeled, the privilege cannot apply;156 however, in Texas, failure to “label a 
document under this section does not constitute a waiver of the audit privilege or 
create a presumption that the privilege does or does not apply.”157 
Invoking the environmental audit privilege is generally subject to several 
exceptions.  One of Ohio’s exceptions to the privilege is that it does not apply to 
criminal investigations or proceedings.158  Oregon and Illinois, however, require an 
in camera review of the audit to determine if the audit privilege can still apply in a 
criminal proceeding.159  If, during a criminal proceeding, the court determines that a 
                                                                
149OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 468.963(1) (West 2002); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3745.71(A) 
(West 2002).  Stensvaag, supra note 28 at 88, 101.  
150OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3745.71(A) (West 2002). 
151Stensvaag, supra note 29, at 102. 
152Id.  Under this provision, it is foreseeable that information affecting OSHA could be 
included in the audit, because although OSHA is not an environmental statute, it is related to 
various provisions of environmental statutes. 
153Id. at 127.  See, e.g., 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/52.2(i) (1998) (“’Environmental Audit 
Report’ means a set of documents, each labeled ‘Environmental Audit Report: Privileged 
Document’ and prepared as a result of an environmental audit”).   
154OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.71(C)(12)(a)-(b) (West 2002) (providing for electronic 
record labeling also). 
155TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. § 4447cc(4)(d) (Vernon 2002). 
156OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.71(C)(12)(a)-(b) (West 2002). 
157TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. § 4447cc(4)(d) (Vernon 2002). 
158OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3745.71(C) (West 2002). 
159OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963(3)(c) (1999); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/52.2(d)(2) (1998). 
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company has asserted the privilege for fraudulent purposes, or the material is not 
subject to the privilege, or the audit shows evidence of violation of any 
environmental law or regulation that was not corrected or reported in a reasonable 
time, the privilege will be revoked.160 
An additional exception that most legislatures have provided is that the privilege 
may not extend to documents or information that is required to be “collected, 
developed, maintained, or reported, under various laws.”161  This provision is 
consistent with the purported purpose of the audit privilege statutes, which is to 
encourage facilities to conduct compliance audits that would not otherwise occur.162  
Besides, there is no need to provide encouragement for audits and investigations that 
are currently mandated.163  
Similarly, most statutes do not allow the privilege to extend to information that is 
obtained independently from the audit.164  Ohio’s statute contains a limitation that 
any “observation, sampling, monitoring, a communication, a record, or a report that 
is not part of the audit on which the audit report is based” may not be claimed 
privileged information.165 For example, the only material expressly accorded 
privileged status in most states is the audit report itself; therefore, as Ohio’s statute 
indicates, documents that are not prepared for the environmental audit and are not 
“part of the audit on which the audit report is based” are probably “independently 
obtained.”166  This is also consistent with the purported purpose of the statutes, which 
is to encourage self-policing of the facility, in that this privilege cannot prohibit 
agencies or others from disclosing compliance information that was independently 
gathered from the audit.167  When one broadly interprets Ohio’s language, it appears 
that as long as the information is gathered during the audit and is related to the audit, 
it may be included in the environmental audit report.  This statutory provision 
appears to provide an incentive to include anything in the audit that one would like to 
be privileged. 
Finally, after a regulated company conducts an audit, it may assert the privilege.  
Upon initiation of litigation, however, a regulated company asserting privilege over 
its environmental audit has the burden of proving that the privilege should apply.168  
Generally, this means that the company must simply show that the information in the 
audit was gathered for the purpose of the audit and that the audit was done in the 
                                                                
160OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963(3)(c)(A)-(D) (West 1999); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/52.2(d)(2)(A)-(C) (1998). 
161Stensvaag, supra note 29, at 133. 
162Id. at 134. 
163Id. 
164Id. at 138. 
165OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.71(C)(5) (West 2002). 
166Stensvaag, supra note 29, at 138. 
167Id. 
168See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963(3)(c) (2002); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3745.71 (E) 
(West 2002) (setting the burden of proof at a preponderance of the evidence); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 8-1-310 (Michie 1999).  
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ordinary course of business, as opposed to being conducted at the mandate of a 
governmental agency.   
In order to overcome the privilege, the party seeking disclosure of the audit must 
then prove that the privilege is being asserted for a fraudulent purpose.169  The 
burden to prove that the privilege is being asserted for a fraudulent purpose results in 
a tremendous irony: it is difficult to prove a fraudulent purpose if the very 
information that would be used as evidence of fraud is legally withheld from 
evidence.   
The state audit privilege statutes appear to be fair in the criminal context, where 
most statutes exempt audit reports from the privilege in the event of a criminal 
investigation.  Additionally, some statutes require the audit report to be appropriately 
labeled privileged.  Most state statutes, however, including Ohio’s, have broad 
language that may have the effect of granting greater discretion to invoke the 
privilege than even the state legislatures foresaw.  Whether the statutes are read 
narrowly or broadly, their effect is to foreclose the public’s access to information 
that it has a right to know so that it may better protect our quality of life and 
participate in the regulatory enforcement process as provided for in most 
environmental statutes. 
IV.  U.S. EPA FINAL POLICY STATEMENT ON INCENTIVES FOR SELF-POLICING 
As opposed to the state environmental audit privilege statutes, the U.S. EPA has 
a more appropriate policy for encouraging the use of voluntary environmental audits.  
This policy is also more consistent with protecting public health and the public’s 
right to know.  The U.S. EPA Final Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-Policing 
(hereinafter Policy) is the EPA’s policy on voluntary environmental audits and its 
position on environmental audit privilege.170  According to the EPA, the Policy is 
designed to promote increased compliance with laws and regulations that protect 
human health and the environment, while simultaneously allowing the regulated 
community to reasonably police itself using voluntary environmental audits.171  In 
order to achieve a balance in enforcement and compliance, the Policy provides 
waivers from certain types of penalties and procedures if a facility’s voluntary 
environmental audit meets certain conditions.172  Instead of granting privilege or 
immunity for disclosure of violations, the EPA offers reduced or waived penalties for 
prompt disclosure and corrective action.173 
The EPA will waive some penalties and prosecutorial procedures once a 
company conducts a voluntary audit and detects a violation or potential violation, 
provided the company meets eight conditions.174  The first condition is that the 
                                                                
169OR REV. STAT. § 468.963(3)(c) (2002). 
170EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,618. 
171Id.  The EPA defines an environmental audit as “a systematic, documented, periodic 
and objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to 
meeting environmental requirements.”  Id. at 19,625. 
172Id. at 19,618.  This is similar to many state immunity provisions, but discussion is 
outside the scope of this Note.  See generally Dana, supra note 38. 
173Dahl, supra note 1, at 110. 
174EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,620. 
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company must voluntarily discover the environmental violation.175  For example, a 
voluntary discovery is not the result of “monitoring, sampling or an auditing 
procedure that is required by statute, regulation, permit, judicial or administrative 
order, or consent agreement.”176  The second condition, and arguably the most 
important, is that the facility must disclose to the EPA violations discovered through 
the audit within twenty-one days of discovery.177  Prompt disclosure is evidence of 
the facility’s good faith effort to achieve or return to compliance as quickly as 
possible and not to conceal the violation.178 
The third condition is that both discovery and disclosure must be independent of 
any government agency or a third party, which encourages facilities to take initiative 
to uncover problems.179  For example, if a citizens’ group has provided notice of its 
intent to sue under a citizen suit provision, or where a whistleblower has reported the 
violation, the problem then has been discovered and disclosed by a third party, and 
the facility cannot meet this third condition.180 
The fourth condition is that the facility must begin correction and remediation no 
later than sixty days from the discovery date, or as expeditiously as possible.181  This 
enables the EPA to ensure that the regulated facility will be publicly accountable for 
its commitment to correct the violation.182  Fifth, the facility is required to take steps 
to ensure prevention of recurrence.183  Preventative measures may include, but are 
not limited to, improving the entity’s environmental auditing and disclosure efforts 
or improving compliance management systems.184  Sixth, a facility may not have the 
same or closely related violations at the same facility within three years in order to 
be eligible for the penalty exemptions under the Policy.185  Seventh, the violation 
must not result in injury that causes “serious actual harm to the environment” or 
                                                                
175Id. at 19,621. 
176Id. 
177Id. 
178Id. at 19,622. 
179EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,622. 
180Id.  Additionally, discovery will not be considered independent where a third party has 
already filed a complaint (either formally in the judicial or administrative context or 
informally to an agency) or where discovery of the violation by the government was 
imminent.  Id. 
181The EPA recognizes that some corrections involving technology issues or capital 
expenditures require more time than sixty days, however, the facility will still be expected to 
“do its utmost to achieve or return to compliance as expeditiously as possible.”  Id.  
Additionally, after the correction and remediation have been completed, the facility must 
certify in writing to all appropriate Federal, State, and local authorities that it has corrected the 
violation, thereby ensuring public accountability.  Id. 
182EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,622. 
183Id. 
184Id. 
185Id.  “This condition covers situations in which the regulated entity has had clear notice 
of its noncompliance and an opportunity to correct the problem.”  Id. at 19,623. 
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presents “an imminent and substantial danger to public health or the environment.”186  
Lastly, the facility must cooperate with and provide information to the EPA, so that 
the EPA can determine how the Policy applies to the facility’s situation.187 
The Policy provides three incentives for facilities to conduct environmental 
audits that meet these eight established conditions.  These incentives include 
reducing gravity-based civil penalties by 75-100%, declining to recommend criminal 
prosecution, and refraining from routine requests for audits.188  These three 
incentives provide a framework for regulated facilities to legally avoid some of the 
most costly and burdensome sanctions resulting from environmental noncompliance.   
The first incentive is limiting or eliminating gravity-based penalties, which are 
punitive fines that reflect the severity of the violator’s behavior.189  These fines are 
usually added to the economic-based penalty, which is a fine equal to the financial 
benefit gained when the violator derives a financial advantage over its competitors 
by breaking the law.190  For two reasons, the EPA remains “firmly committed” to its 
discretionary policy to penalize companies for the economic benefit derived from 
noncompliance.191  First, regulated facilities are more likely to comply with 
regulations in a timely manner when there is a risk of losing an economic benefit that 
is gained from noncompliance.192  Second, collecting the economic benefit preserves 
a level playing field between law-abiding companies and those who seek to undercut 
their competitors by not complying.193  For example, if a facility fails to comply with 
a regulation that requires facilities of its type to install scrubbers on its smoke stacks, 
then by not expending capital to upgrade its equipment, the violating facility gains a 
competitive advantage over the facilities that do comply; this monetary difference is 
assessed as an economic-based penalty.194 
As a second incentive for facilities to conduct environmental audits, the EPA 
avoids implementing criminal enforcement when facilities voluntarily discover, 
promptly disclose, and quickly correct violations in addition to other conditions 
                                                                
186EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,623.  However, although a release into the 
environment may be potentially seriously harmful, it is not necessarily “actually” seriously 
harmful, nor will a release necessarily present an imminent and substantial danger.  Id. 
187Id.  To this end, the facility cannot “hide, destroy, or tamper with possible evidence” 
after discovery of a potential environmental violation.  Id. 
188Id. at 19,619-20. 
189EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,620. 
190Id. 
191Id.  However, since the inception of the policy in January 1996, 450 companies have 
disclosed violations at 1,870 facilities and EPA has granted reduction or forgiveness of 
gravity-based penalties to 164 companies and 540 facilities.  See Enforcement: FY 1998 EPA 
Action Led to $184 Million in Criminal, Civil, Administrative Penalties, 23 CHEM. REG. REP. 
22 (1999). 
192EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,620. 
193Id. 
194For further discussion of economic-based penalties, see Calculation of the Economic 
Benefit of Noncompliance in EPA’s Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed. Reg. 32, 948 
(1999). 
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discussed above.195  There are, however, two important limitations to the “no 
recommendation for criminal prosecution” incentive.196  First, there can be no 
evidence of “potentially culpable behavior.”197  For example, the facility could not 
have intentionally or knowingly violated the law.  Second, violations that cause 
serious harm or which may pose an imminent and substantial danger to human health 
or the environment will most likely be criminally prosecuted.198 
The third incentive for conducting self-audits is that the EPA will not routinely 
request audit reports, which in the past were used to trigger enforcement 
investigations.199  Through its Audit Policy, the EPA wants to encourage discovery, 
disclosure, and prompt correction of environmental violations; therefore facilities are 
generally assured that the information disclosed will reduce their liability, not 
expand it.200   This incentive also has its limitations.  For example, if there is 
independent evidence of a violation, the EPA may request an audit report that has not 
been previously disclosed in order to determine the extent and nature of the violation 
and degree of culpability.201  
According to the EPA, the Audit Policy has been widely used and is successful in 
encouraging disclosure of existing problems, “while preserving fair and effective 
enforcement.”202  Almost three and one half years after the EPA first implemented 
the Audit Policy, “approximately 670 organizations had disclosed actual or potential 
violations at more than 2700 facilities.” 203  Additionally, EPA conducted an Audit 
Policy User’s Survey in 1999, which revealed that 88% of respondents said “that 
they would use the Policy again, and 84% stat[ed] that they would recommend the 
Policy to clients and/or their counterparts.”204  Most importantly, none of the survey 
respondents said that they would be unwilling to use the Policy again or would be 
unwilling to recommend use of the Policy to others.205  During the first three years, 
                                                                
195As discussed in the text above, in addition to voluntary discovery, disclosure within 
twenty-one days after discovery and prompt correction and remediation, the violation 
discovery and disclosure must be independent of government or a third party plaintiff, 
prevention of recurrence must occur, there can be no repeat violations, the injury may not 
result in serious actual harm to the environment or present an imminent and substantial danger 
to public health or the environment, and the facility must cooperate as required by EPA. EPA 
Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,621-23. 
196EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,620. 
197Id.  
198Id. 
199Id.  It has been EPA’s policy to refrain from routine requests for audit reports since 
1986 and it will only request a report where the information contained in the audit report is not 
readily available elsewhere and where EPA decides that the information is necessary to 
determine whether the terms and conditions of the Policy have been met.  Id. 
200EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19620. 
201Id. 
202Id. at 1B. 
203Id. 
204Id. 
205Id. 
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the EPA granted reduction or forgiveness of penalties to 540 facilities and 164 
companies.206 
The Audit Policy creates a comprehensive system, whereby companies who 
discover, disclose, and remedy their violations promptly and in good faith are 
rewarded with reduced penalties.207  Through the Audit Policy, the EPA reserves the 
appropriate rights to investigate and prosecute those companies who do not discover 
or disclose their violations, or in the worse case scenario, intentionally violate the 
law or act slowly to correct the violation.  Most importantly, the Policy is consistent 
with protecting the public’s right to know what it is being exposed to in our 
communities and is therefore more protective of public health and the environment. 
V.  THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT-TO-KNOW AND ITS CONFLICT WITH A  
PRIVILEGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS 
The public’s right to know is a concept that, although not explicitly stated in 
federal or state environmental statutes, is nevertheless one of the bases for passage of 
many environmental laws and is strongly supported by the public.  The right to know 
is the theory where, once the public has information on the “nature and amount of 
chemical that industry releases into the environment, the public will motivate 
industry to reduce pollution in a way that the EPA cannot – by protesting, by 
boycotting, and, most importantly, by shining the media’s spotlight on the 
company.”208  The public relies on this right to know policy to help enforce 
environmental statutes and regulations as evidenced by its use of good neighbor 
campaigns and, particularly, citizen suits.  To facilitate such public pressure and 
involvement in pollution prevention and reduction, the EPA has made the public 
right to know “one of the Agency’s top priorities” as evidenced by its expansion of 
the Toxic Release Inventory.209 
In support of the public’s right to know, the EPA states in its Audit Policy that 
“the public relies on timely and accurate reports from the regulated community, not 
only to measure compliance, but to evaluate health or environmental risk and gauge 
progress in reducing” pollution.210   Congress has also repeatedly recognized a right 
to know policy as evidenced by the fact that EPCRA,211 the Clean Air Act,212 the 
Clean Water Act,213 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act214 all contain 
provisions that imply a public right to know by providing the right of the public to 
                                                                
206Cheryl Hogue, 23 CHEM 22 (1999). 
207See generally Dana, supra note 38 and accompanying text to note 40 (on how immunity 
provisions may deter effective enforcement of environmental laws). 
208Peter L. Gray, Environmental Data on the Internet: A Wired Public Setting 
Environmental Policy, 30 ENVTL L. REP. 10122 (2000). 
209Id.  See also text supra II(B)(1). 
210EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,621. 
21142 U.S.C.A. §§ 11001-11050 (West 2002). 
21242 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 2002). 
21333 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2002). 
21442 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 2002). 
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participate in the permitting processes for polluting facilities, to access information 
compiled by industries regarding compliance, and to enforce the environmental 
statutes and regulations through citizen suits. 
There is, however, no explicit provision in any federal environmental statute that 
compels disclosure of the kind of information found in a voluntary environmental 
audit and may be claimed privileged under the states’ environmental audit privilege 
statutes.215 Additionally, there is no direct statutory conflict between a federal statute 
and the state environmental audit privilege statutes, where the federal statute would 
preempt the state environmental audit privilege statutes, thereby rendering the state 
statutes unconstitutional.216 
Proponents of the audit privilege statutes argue that because the environmental 
statutes do not require disclosure of the voluntarily discovered audit information, that 
this information should be privileged.  Opponents of the audit privilege and 
immunity laws argue that the public’s right to know, which is one of the implicit 
bases of each of the federal environmental statutes, is in direct conflict with these 
state audit privilege statutes.217  Opponents further argue that although the 
environmental statutes do not contain explicit language requiring disclosure of 
voluntary audits, there is an explicit right to know policy behind disallowing a 
privilege over the information gathered from these audits.218 
There is a diverse group that opposes the state audit privilege laws based on the 
alleged conflict with the public’s right to know.  This group includes environmental, 
consumer, public health, and civil rights non-profit organizations, the U.S. EPA, and 
the United States Department of Justice, as well as community groups and advocates.  
The EPA is steadfastly opposed to the environmental audit privilege laws because 
these statutes “shield evidence of wrongdoing and prevent investigation of 
environmental violations.”219  Additionally, the EPA feels that in light of its Audit 
Policy, the state audit privilege laws “undermine law enforcement, impair protection 
of human health and the environment, and interfere with the public’s right to know 
of potential and existing environmental hazards.”220 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has said that the state 
environmental audit privilege laws create “a corporate environmental secrecy act 
[that] is contrary to the public’s right to know that underlies much of the reporting 
and disclosure requirements in current environmental law.”221 Additionally, the DOJ 
                                                                
215It has been argued that EPA could tighten up its regulations and broaden what it 
compels to be disclosed to the agency.  See Dahl supra note 1, at 107.  Mandating broader 
reporting requirements is likely to be met with great opposition by the regulated community.  
Additionally, the process of drafting, soliciting comments, conducting hearings, and rewriting 
numerous regulatory procedures and requirements is likely to take years to implement.  
216U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
217Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable Communities at www.environweb.org/gnp (last 
updated Oct. 5, 2001). 
218Id. 
219EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,618, 19,623. 
220EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,618, 19,623. 
221Steven P. Solow, Audit Privilege and Immunity Legislation and the Department of 
Justice Policy on Voluntary Disclosure, SD19 ALI-ABA 21, 26 (Sept. 17, 1998). 
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has stated that the “law sends a powerful message that knowledge gives rise to a duty 
to remedy.  An audit privilege undercuts this message by taking the extraordinary 
step of creating an evidentiary privilege that would have significance only where the 
duty to remedy had been violated.”222  This gets to the heart of the conflict – that 
there would be little reason to withhold environmental audit information from the 
public and regulatory agencies if there were nothing to hide. 
Many legislators and environmental groups are opposed to Ohio’s audit privilege 
law, which also contains an immunity component, because of the perceived threat to 
the public’s right to access information about environmental problems in their 
communities.  During Ohio State Senate debates, then Ohio State Senator Dennis 
Kucinich called the Ohio audit privilege and immunity bill a “polluters protection 
bill” and stated that “this bill is not in the interest of the community because people 
have a right to know what kind of pollutants are being poured into their 
neighborhoods.”223  The Ohio Chapter of the Sierra Club characterized the bill as one 
that would “protect polluters from oversight and penalties by creating secret 
documents that hide violations of environmental laws.”224 
A look at some of the provisions of the audit privilege statutes provides ample 
support that the conflict is real, and not just theoretical.  Although on the surface the 
“independent source” exception to Ohio’s audit privilege may be helpful to 
resourceful citizens, it may also present a serious problem for the public’s right to 
know.225  For example, if privileged audit information is leaked by a whistleblower 
who does not have the authority to waive the privilege, and this sets off a third party 
investigation, will the results of the third party investigation be considered “obtained 
from an independent source?”226 If information regarding a violation is obtained from 
an independent source, then the information is admissible in legal proceedings.  The 
defendant company could, however, argue that, consistent with the  “fruits of the 
poisonous tree”  Fourth Amendment doctrine, that the third party information has not 
been obtained independently of the audit and is therefore not admissible evidence.227  
The extension of the privilege in this manner presents a serious affront to the 
public’s right to know.  Without the privilege, the information would likely be 
disclosed by the company out of fear of prosecution, but with the privilege in place; 
even well meaning third parties may not be able to uncover information from an 
audit. 
The overbroad language in the Ohio environmental audit privilege statute 
provides another conflict with the public’s right to know.   Ohio allows the inclusion 
of information in an audit that may be only peripherally related to environmental 
issues or environmental statutes.  This creates the potential that everything but the 
                                                                
222Id. at 27. 
223T.C. Brown, Senate Passes Bill to Protect Businesses in Pollution Audits, THE PLAIN 
DEALER, Jan. 11, 1996, at A12. 
224Id. 
225Stensvaag, supra note 29, at 139, 140. 
226Id. 
227Id. 
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proverbial kitchen sink could be included in the privileged environmental audit, 
thereby keeping critical non-environmental information from the public as well. 
Most compellingly, the federal statutory right of citizens to sue violators is in 
direct conflict with state environmental audit privilege laws.  The right of a citizen to 
sue a violator is critical for understanding the conflict that state audit privilege laws 
present to the public’s right to know.  If a citizen can file a lawsuit against a violating 
facility, it is reasonably foreseeable that citizens would have grounds to successfully 
pursue these suits, provided there were sufficient facts and evidence.228  In order for a 
plaintiff to successfully meet its required burden of proof that a violation exists or 
has occurred, plaintiffs must have access to information about the facility’s alleged 
illegal conduct.  It makes no sense for Congress to consistently include in all major 
federal environmental statutes the right of the people to sue a violator of the law, if it 
had anticipated that information crucial to successful litigation would be precluded 
from disclosure and discovery as a result of a state statutory privilege.  Before the 
state audit privilege laws existed,229 when a citizen suit was filed pursuant to one of 
the federal environmental statutes, the environmental audit was most likely 
discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.230 Additionally, under the 
EPA’s Audit Policy, once a formal settlement has been reached between the EPA 
and a facility, the EPA makes available to the public a copy of the settlement 
agreement and other documents related to the company’s disclosure.231  The EPA has 
explicitly stated that it makes these documents available to the public because it 
“supports the public’s right to know about environmental violations and the 
Agency’s response to violations.”232  The disclosed information could likely aid 
citizens in building or proving a private tort claim against a company.  Additionally, 
the information may lead citizens to evidence of other violations that were not part of 
the settlement agreement between the EPA and the company.  In that instance, it may 
be possible for citizens to submit a notice of intent to file a citizen suit against the 
company or the EPA to enforce compliance with the statute or regulation.233  If a 
company does not choose to use the EPA Audit Policy, and instead invokes a state 
privilege over its environmental audits, the public is precluded from accessing this 
vital information for use in citizen suits or private suits. 
                                                                
228Congress would not likely have passed a provision that allowed citizens to file frivolous 
lawsuits against regulated industries.  
229And in states that have not passes a privilege for environmental audits.  
230FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (setting forth general provisions governing discovery; duty of 
disclosure).  As a practical note, most citizen suits are filed in federal court or are removed to 
federal court where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. 
231EPA Audit Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. at 19,624.  The documents would not be released to the 
public if “the disclosing entity claims them as Confidential Business Information (and that 
claim is validated by U.S. EPA), [or if] another exemption under the Freedom of Information 
Act is asserted and/or applies, or the Privacy Act or any other law would preclude such 
release.”  Id. 
232Id. 
233For example, under the Clean Air Act, a citizen must file with the EPA a notice of 
intent to sue at least sixty days prior to filing a complaint against the EPA or a facility for an 
alleged violation of the Clean Air Act.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (West 2002).   
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Another related criticism of the environmental audit privilege statutes is that 
these statutes may inhibit criminal prosecutions and civil litigation because the 
privileged audits may only be revealed, if at all, once the discovery phase has 
commenced in litigation, not prior.234  For these reasons, the only solution to prevent 
the potential harm caused by state environmental audit privilege statutes is to enact 
federal legislation prohibiting a privilege for voluntarily conducted environmental 
audits.   
VI.  ADVOCATING FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO PREEMPT STATE  
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PRIVILEGE STATUTES 
As discussed above, none of the federal environmental statutes compels 
disclosure of the type of information generally included in an environmental audit.  
The environmental audits are usually quite detailed and comprehensive, which is 
why the information is so valuable and crucial to the public’s right to know what it is 
being exposed to by any given facility.  On the contrary, most environmental statutes 
only require the disclosure of small pieces of information, or static “snap shots” of 
what is occurring at a facility on a given date, and the facility usually has notice of 
when the “snap shot” will be taken.  As one court observed,  
An entity which has notice when an observation is to occur will be 
motivated to meet the compliance standard at that time.  But continuous 
compliance, not contrived compliance is the goal here …  It is fair to 
assume that compliance data being reported by States do not indicate what 
is happening at a facility on a day-to-day basis, but rather whether the 
source has been determined to be in compliance at an announced 
inspection after it has had the opportunity to optimize the performance of 
its control equipment.  Thus, it indicates whether the source is capable of 
being in compliance rather than whether it is in compliance in its day-to-
day operations.235 
Therefore, like the TRI data that is reported in best estimate quantities by facilities, 
the “snap shots” have limited use in pursuing enforcement action against an alleged 
violator.  Additionally, it is unlikely that a facility will provide access to a citizen to 
monitor whether a facility is in compliance.236  Therefore, if a citizen cannot 
practicably collect accurate data oneself because one lacks the right to access the 
facility, and the facility’s compliance data is neither comprehensive nor 
representative, and the monitoring data and other information collected by the 
facility is unavailable to citizens because it is privileged, then it “follows that the 
alleged violator is afforded a large measure of control over enforcement of the 
[environmental laws] by citizens groups.”237  In this circumstance, Congress’ intent 
that citizens could successfully pursue alleged violators of public health laws through 
citizen suits is effectively thwarted. 
                                                                
234See generally Allen Kezsbom, Discovery Issues in Environmental Litigation, SE98 ALI-
ABA 207 (2000). 
235Sierra Club, 894 F. Supp. at 1460. 
236Id. 
237Id. 
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One solution to bypass the state environmental audit privilege statutes would be 
to broaden the mandatory reporting requirements for certain data under the current 
federal environmental statutes.  This solution, however, is likely to be unsuccessful 
for several reasons.  First, because of the complex process of amending regulations, 
the amount of time required to broaden reporting requirements would take years.  In 
the mean time, the public’s right to know would continue to be compromised and 
public health potentially jeopardized.  Second, even if time were not a factor, the 
political challenge to modifying all of these regulations would be enormous.  
Industries watch carefully and respond immediately to EPA proposals to strengthen 
environmental standards that impact their activities.  The process of attempting to 
strengthen regulations may also be less advantageous to environmental groups and 
the public, who are usually less aware of changes in environmental regulations, and 
are therefore less equipped to respond to industry arguments.  Third, Congress has 
included in many statutes provisions that only allow the EPA to promulgate specific 
regulations under the statute.  Therefore, the EPA may not have the authority to 
enact regulations to broaden reporting requirements. 
Additionally, repealing these state statutes, although a preferred option, is not 
realistic either.  Environmental groups and public health advocates would not likely 
have the staff and monetary resources necessary to launch massive campaigns to 
repeal these statutes, currently on the books in twenty-two states.  In many states, 
public interest organizations campaigned actively against the passage of these 
statutes and yet the bills were enacted into law regardless.  When confronted with the 
sophisticated public relations and lobbying campaigns of deep-pocketed industries, a 
public interest campaign to repeal a law already on the books would not likely be 
successful; twenty-two separate campaigns stand an even worse chance of success. 
The best solution to protect public health and the public’s right to know is to 
enact federal legislation to prohibit the use of the privilege for environmental 
audits.238  The language of the federal legislation could be substantially similar to the 
U.S. EPA’s Policy on Self-Audits and would ban the use of a privilege for 
environmental audits.  A federal law would extinguish the future use of the state 
environmental audit privilege statutes because of the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution.239 
Proponents of environmental audit privilege argue that the privilege encourages 
more voluntary environmental audits, which is positive for the facility, public health, 
and the environment.  But as the court in LEAN, Inc. v. Evans Industries, Inc. stated, 
“there is no reason to believe that the possibility of disclosure during discovery 
would deter” voluntary environmental audits because “the consequences of failure to 
                                                                
238The author recognizes that “the Federal Rules of Evidence generally defer to state or 
common law on the issue of privilege.”  Gary W. Ballesteros, The Limitations of State 
Environmental Audit Privilege Statutes, ENVIRONMENT TODAY, April 1995, available at 
http://www.jenner.com/practice/environ/articles/gwb9601.html.  Interestingly, however, at the 
time of publication, there have been no proceedings in federal court where state environmental 
audit privilege statutes have been tested.  It is my belief that federal courts will not rule in 
favor of defendants’ use of the environmental audit privilege because this privilege conflicts 
with the public’s right to know and is inconsistent with other public policies that support other 
evidentiary privileges.  Defense counsels may be playing it safe in this regard. 
239U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause stands for the proposition that federal 
law is supreme over state law that is inconsistent with the federal law. 
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comply with state and federal environmental laws and regulations … debarment 
from entering into government contracts and public disapproval – make it essential 
that corporations constantly evaluate their compliance with those laws and 
regulations.”240  In fact, prior to the passage of all state environmental audit privilege 
statutes except Oregon’s, a 1995 Price Waterhouse survey of U.S. businesses found 
that over half of the companies who responded were performing “some auditing 
activity…[and] among companies with over $1 billion annual sales or 10,000 
employees, virtually all performed some form of environmental auditing.”241  A 
reasonable extrapolation of the figures in this survey supports the argument that if 
the regulated community was conducting voluntary environmental audits prior to the 
enactment of environmental audit privilege statutes, then they are likely not going to 
discontinue auditing if the privilege is revoked.  Additionally, that same survey 
found that over sixty percent of the companies that conducted audits stated that the 
“key to encouraging more auditing would be the regulators’ adoption of an 
enforcement policy eliminating penalties for self-identified, reported, and remedied 
items.”242  This recommendation is precisely what the EPA provided when it 
introduced its Audit Policy in late 1995, and this remains the practice of the EPA 
today. 
Federal legislation preempting the environmental audit privilege supports the 
public policy underlying all environmental legislation - that the public has a right to 
know information regarding environmental pollution in its community, and has the 
right to participate in the enforcement of facility compliance when the government 
cannot or will not act on the public’s behalf.  Enacting federal legislation is the most 
effective and efficient way to guarantee that the public and regulatory agencies can 
obtain the results of voluntary environmental audit information to ensure compliance 
with state and federal environmental laws and to protect public health and the 
environment.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
State environmental audit privilege statutes allow regulated industries to conduct 
self-audits of environmental systems, claim privilege over the information, and in 
most cases, receive complete or limited immunity from criminal and civil penalties, 
when, or if, the information is disclosed.  Currently there is no explicit law-based 
conflict with states’ voluntary audit privilege statutes, but there is a significant public 
policy conflict.  In particular, the legislatively created environmental audit privilege 
is diametrically opposed to the policy of the public’s right to know what pollutants 
regulated facilities are emitting and whether facilities are in compliance with 
environmental and public health laws.   
The conflict between audit privilege and the public’s right to know frustrates one 
of the primary purposes of environmental laws, which is to protect human health and 
the environment.  There are several possible solutions, but only one that is 
                                                                
2401996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8117, 1996 WL 32558 at *2, 43 ERC 1190 (E.D. La. 1996). 
241Heyob, supra note 132, at 384 (citing Price Waterhouse L.L.P., THE VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT SURVEY OF U.S. BUSINESS 22 (1995)). 
242Id. at 384-5.  (citing Price Waterhouse L.L.P., THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT 
SURVEY OF U.S. BUSINESS 42 (1995).  “The second most commonly cited factor (by 49 
percent) was a federal audit privilege law.  Id. 
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realistically achievable.  Repeal of the state statutes is politically unlikely, and would 
require individual campaigns in twenty-two states.  Additionally, an effort to broaden 
the mandatory reporting requirements under each of the major federal environmental 
statutes would require years of negotiating and would likely result in legal battles.  
The only realistic solution to the problems presented by environmental audit 
privilege laws is federal legislation codifying the U.S. EPA’s Policy on Self-Audits.  
Federal legislation enacting the U.S. EPA policy and statutorily recognizing the 
public’s right to know would neuter the state environmental audit privilege statutes 
by making them unconstitutional and is in the best interest of the public’s 
indisputable right to know. 
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